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An increasing fraction of jobs in the U.S. labor market explicitly pay workers for their
performance using a bonus, a commission, or a piece rate. In this paper, we look at the
e⁄ect of the growing incidence of performance pay on wage inequality. The basic premise
of the paper is that performance pay jobs have a more ￿competitive￿pay structure that
rewards productivity di⁄erences more than other jobs. Consistent with this view, we show
that compensation in performance pay jobs is more closely tied to both measured (by the
econometrician) and unmeasured productive characteristics of workers. We conclude that
the growing incidence of performance pay accounts for 25 percent of the growth in male wage
inequality between the late 1970s and the early 1990s.1 Introduction
In the standard competitive model of the labor market, wages are equal to marginal products
and the wage structure is determined by the equilibrium of demand and supply factors. This
simple model forms the backbone of most studies on the evolution of wage inequality. For
example, Katz and Murphy (1992) argue that the return to schooling increased in the 1980s
because the rate of increase in the relative supply of more-educated labor decelerated while
relative demand was increasing steadily. Similarly, Juhn et al. (1993) argue that the growth
in within-group wage inequality throughout the 1970s and 1980s was driven by an increase in
the demand for unobserved skills. More generally, an important advantage of the standard
competitive model of the labor market is that it provides a straightforward interpretation of
the evolution of the wage structure in terms of the supply and demand for di⁄erent types of
labor.
This being said, it is also well established that the competitive model is at best a good
approximation for the way wages are actually determined in the labor market. Unless mar-
kets are complete and information is perfect, wages will generally not be equal to marginal
products. There are indeed a large number of studies that con￿rm that wages are not equal
to marginal products because of incomplete markets, incomplete (or asymmetric) informa-
tion, or other considerations. For instance, Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) show compelling
evidence that wages depend on labor market conditions at the time a worker started his or
her job. This is consistent with a simple risk-sharing implicit contract, but inconsistent with
the competitive model that predicts that wages should only depend on current labor market
conditions. Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) provide evidence that
wages are not equal to marginal products because information is imperfect and it takes time
to ￿rms to learn about the actual productivity of workers.
A more ￿mundane￿reason why wages are not equal to marginal products is the presence
of labor market institutions. For example, it is well established that labor unions tend to
compress the wage structure (Freeman (1980), Card (1996), Lemieux (1998)) and reduce
the wage di⁄erence between more productive and less-productive workers relative to a non-
union setting. Similarly, a substantial number of workers at the bottom end of the wage
distribution are paid a legislated minimum wage instead of their actual marginal product.
1Because of these contracting, observability, and institutional factors, wages are clearly
not equal to marginal products and the full distribution of wages is not simply determined by
standard demand and supply factors. This does not necessarily mean, however, that changes
in the wage distribution are not well explained by changes in demand and supply factors. For
example, if contracting, observability, and institutional factors introduce a purely random
di⁄erence (error term) between wages and marginal products, changes in the wage structure
will not be a⁄ected by these factors. Put in these terms, the key question is not whether the
competitive model is only an approximation for the way wages are actually set, but whether
the quality of the approximation is constant over time.
Existing studies already show, however, that the e⁄ect of labor market institutions is
neither random nor stable over time. For instance, DiNardo et al. (1996) attribute to the
decline in unionization and in the real value of the minimum wage about a third of the
increase in wage inequality in the 1980s. In the context of the above discussion, their ￿ndings
suggest that the competitive model has become an increasingly good approximation for the
way wages are actually set in the labor market. Part of the increase in wage inequality thus
re￿ ects the fact that workers who used to earn a union or a minimum wage are now earning
a more competitive wage.
These ￿ndings raise the obvious question of whether departures between wages and mar-
ginal products induced by factors other than labor market institutions may have also changed
over time. There are indeed a number reasons to believe that this may be the case. For
example, improvements in the functioning of ￿nancial markets may reduce the need for ￿rms
to provide insurance to workers through implicit contracts. As a result, ￿rms may be paying
a wage that is increasingly close to the actual marginal product of workers. Another relevant
change is the advances in information and communication technologies that have dramatic-
ally reduced to cost of gathering and processing information. One important implication of
these changes is that it may now be cheaper for ￿rms to collect and process detailed informa-
tion about the individual performance and the productivity of workers. In about any model
where wages are not set to marginal products because information is costly, a reduction in
the cost of information will lead to wages being closer to marginal products.
While it is not generally possible to know whether or not individual wages are equal
to marginal products, some observable variables about the form of compensation used may
2be useful proxies for how close wages are to marginal products. In particular, the basic
assumption of this paper is that total compensation on jobs that pay for performance using
a bonus, a commission, or a piece rate will tend to be closer to marginal products than
compensation on jobs that do not pay for performance.
The contribution of the paper is threefold. We ￿rst show, using data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), that the incidence of performance pay has increased
substantially since the late 1970s. This increase is consistent, for instance, with the view that
the cost of collecting and processing information has declined over time with the advances in
information and communication technologies. Second, we show that wages are be less equally
distributed in performance pay jobs than in other jobs because the return to productive
characteristics like education is larger in performance pay jobs. Combining these two sets
of ￿ndings together, we then show that the growth in performance pay jobs has contributed
substantially to the rise in wage inequality in the United States between the late 1970s and
the early 1990s. We also complement the evidence from the PSID with a brief analysis of
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).
The paper is an interesting complement to studies on labor market institutions that tend
to focus on a very di⁄erent segment of the workforce. We show that workers paid for per-
formance are relatively unlikely to belong to unions or to be paid around the minimum wage.
Just like the decline of unionization and in the real value of the minimum wage may have
made wages in the middle and low end of the wage distribution closer to marginal products,
the growing incidence of performance pay appears to be producing a similar outcome for
workers higher up in the wage distribution.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present a simple measurement model
where performance pay is viewed as a indicator that ￿rms pay wages that are closer to the
marginal product of workers than ￿rms that do not pay for performance. We also derive a
number of testable implications from the simple model. In Section 3, we present the data
used for the empirical analysis and illustrate the growth in the incidence of performance pay
over time. Section 4 presents estimates from the PSID of the e⁄ect of performance pay on
the wage structure, supplemented with some corroborating evidence from the NLSY. We
argue that this evidence is consistent with the view that wages on performance pay jobs are
closer to marginal products than wages on other jobs. We then show in Section 5 how the
3growth in performance pay has contributed to the growth in wage inequality between the
late 1970s and the early 1990s. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Measurement Model
The basic idea of the model is very simple. We start with the traditional distinction between
cases where ￿wages are attached to jobs￿, and cases where ￿wages are attached to workers￿ .
In the former case, the workers￿wages and salaries solely depend on the job they hold. All
workers working on the same job for the same ￿rm are paid the same way. For example, each
job classi￿cation may correspond to a speci￿c wage grid that depends on seniority with the
￿rm. One prime example of jobs that often pay that way are union jobs where the ￿rm and
the union collectively bargain to set the speci￿c wage grid. Even outside the union sector,
however, compensation consultants, such as Hay, have developed systems to measure the
skills needed for a job, which in turn implies that wages re￿ ect the features of the job rather
than the unique abilities of the worker. While some formal models could be used to show
why it could be optimal for ￿rms, in some settings, to pay wages attached to jobs, we do not
attempt to provide such an explanation in this paper. We simply note that, econometrically
speaking, only job characteristics, including seniority, should have an e⁄ect on wages when
wages are attached to jobs. This means that, conditional on job characteristics, individual
productive characteristics of workers such as education have no e⁄ect on their wages. Of
course, the unconditional e⁄ect of education on earnings will still be positive if education
helps workers get better paid jobs.
The result wage setting equation of worker i working for ￿rm j at time t when wages are
attached to jobs is:
yJ
ijt = zijt’t + ￿ij + eijt
where zijt is a set of observed job characteristics like occupation or seniority, ￿ij is a
￿￿rm-speci￿c￿wage term that captures di⁄erences in wage policies across ￿rms, and eijt
is an idiosyncratic pay component. The ￿rm-speci￿c component ￿ij could be linked, for
instance, to the average level of productivity of workers employed by the ￿rm. Even if ￿rms
do not observe individual productivities, ￿rms that turn out to have more productive workers
will be able to pay higher average wages to all workers. Alternatively, ￿ij could capture the
4fact that some ￿rms pay better than others because of reasons such as rent-sharing.
The other polar case we consider is when wages are ￿attached to workers" in the sense that
workers are paid their marginal products, irrespective of the job they hold. This correspond
to a traditional human capital pricing model where workers a simply paid for the marginal
product of their human capital. As in the case of wages attached to jobs, we do not discuss
here why it is that some ￿rms pay wages equal to marginal products, while other do note.
We simply note that, starting the in the late 1970s, many compensations consultants (e.g.
Ed Lawler) began recommending that ￿rms pay the worker rather than the job using formal
evaluation of worker performance. One possible reason for these changes is that formal
evaluation of worker performance may now be easier to implement in practice with advances
in information processing technologies.
The resulting competitive wage setting equation when wages are attached to workers is
a traditional wage equation:
yW
ijt = xit￿t + dt￿i + uijt
where xit represents standard measurable (by the econometrician) characteristics like
potential experience and education, ￿i represents a worker-speci￿c productivity term, and
uijt is an idiosyncratic productivity term. The parameters ￿t and dt are the returns (in terms
of productivity) to measured and unmeasured characteristics.
As discussed in the introduction, existing measures of performance pay are only an imper-
fect indicator of whether a ￿rms pays wages attached to jobs, or wages attached to workers
(competitive wages). For example, some ￿rms may be paying an end of year bonus to all
workers, irrespective of their performance. In that case, the fact that bonuses are used does
not mean that wages are equal to marginal products. By contrast, other ￿rms may be pay-
ing straight wages that nonetheless end up being very to close to the actual productivity of
the workers. In such cases, ￿rms pay wages attached to workers even if we don￿ t formally
observe performance pay schemes such as bonuses, commissions, or piece-rates. To capture
these possibilities, let sp and sn be the probability that workers on performance pay jobs (p)
and non-performance pay jobs (n), respectively, are actually paid their marginal product,
yW
ijt. For performance pay to be an informative measure, it must be that sp > sn, i.e. that
workers who are paid for performance are more likely to by paid on the basis of their mar-
ginal product than workers who are not paid for performance. Conditional on performance
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A number of interesting predictions can be drawn from this model:
1. The return to measurable characteristics xit is larger in performance pay jobs than





2. The return to job characteristics zijt is smaller in performance pay jobs than non-




3. The return to unmeasurable person-speci￿c characteristics ￿i is larger in perform-
ance pay jobs than non-performance pay jobs (d
p
t > dn
t ). One related implication is that,
for a given distribution of ￿i, the variance of the person-speci￿c component will be larger in
performance pay than non-performance pay jobs. When comparing workers on performance
pay and non-performance pay jobs, the variance could also be di⁄erent because of di⁄erences
in the variance of ￿i among these two groups of workers. We will adjust for this empirically
by comparing the variance of the person-speci￿c component in performance pay and non-
performance pay jobs for a subsample of ￿switchers￿who are observed both on performance
pay and non-performance pay jobs.
4. The variance of the ￿rm-speci￿c component is smaller in performance pay jobs




5. The variance of the idiosyncratic term in performance pay jobs, var("
p
ijt), may
either be larger (if var(uijt) > var(eijt) ) or smaller (if var(uijt) < var(eijt)) than the
variance of the idiosyncratic term in non-performance pay jobs, var("n
ijt).
6The predictions will be tested in Section 4. Note, however, that it is not clear from these
predictions what will be the e⁄ect of performance pay on wage inequality. Remember that,
in our framework, an increase in performance pay means that a higher share of workers
are paid their marginal products. Predictions 1 and 3 mean that returns to (measured and
unmeasured) skills increase when the fraction of performance pay jobs increases, which, in
turns, results in more wage inequality. This may be partly o⁄set, however, by that fact
that inequality linked to job characteristics (prediction 2) and ￿rm e⁄ects (prediction 4)
decreases when the fraction of performance pay jobs decreases. Whether or not performance
pay results in more wage inequality is, thus, an empirical question that will be addressed
explicitly in Section 5.
3 Data
The bulk of our analysis is conducted using data from the PSID. The main advantage of
the PSID is that it provides a representative sample of the workforce for a relatively long
period, which is essential for studying the e⁄ect of pay for performance on wage inequality.
One disadvantage of the PSID, however, is that our constructed measures of performance
pay are relatively crude and may be fairly imperfect proxies for whether or not workers are
paid their marginal products. To probe the robustness of the results based on the PSID, we
thus re-estimate some of the key models using the NLSY. The main advantage of the NLSY
is that it asks workers directly whether or not their earnings are based on performance,
bonuses, or commissions. This is arguably a better measure of performance pay than what
is available in the PSID. Unfortunately, the question about performance pay in the NLSY
was only included in the late 1980s and late 1990s. Combined with the fact that the NLSY
only follows a narrow cohort of individuals over time, it is not possible to use the NLSY to
look at the broad-based impact of performance pay on changes in wage inequality.
3.1 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1976-1998)
The PSID sample we use consists of male heads of households aged 18 to 65 with average
hourly earnings between $1.00 and $100.00 (in $79) for the period spanning the years 1976-
71998, where the hourly wage rate is obtained by dividing total earnings in the previous year
by hours of work. .1 Individuals in the public sector or who are self-employed are excluded
from the analysis. This leaves us with a total sample of 30,424 observations for 3,181 workers.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1 and will be discussed below.
3.1.1 Measurement Issues
Identifying performance pay In the PSID, we construct a performance pay indicator
variable by looking at whether part of a worker￿ s total compensation includes a variable pay
component (either a bonus, a commission, or a piece rate). For interview years 1976-1992, we
are able to determine whether a worker received a bonus or a commission over the previous
calendar year through the use of multiple questions. First, workers are asked the amount
of money they received from either working overtime, from commissions, or from bonuses
paid by the employer.2 Second, we know whether workers worked overtime, and if they are
working overtime in a given year, we classify them as not having a variable pay component.3
Third, workers not paid exclusively by the hour or not exclusively by a salary are asked
how they are paid: they can report being paid commissions, piece rates, etc., as well as
combinations of salaried/hour pay with either pieces rates or commissions.4 Through this
combination of questions, we are thus able to identify all non-overtime workers who received
performance pay in the form of either a bonus, a commission, or a piece rate. Starting
with interview year 1993, there are separate questions on the amounts earned in bonuses,
1In the PSID, data on hours worked during year t, as well as on total labor earnings, bo-
nuses/commissions/overtime income, and overtime hours, are asked interview year t+1. Thus we actually
use data covering interview years 1976-1999.
2Note that the question refers speci￿cally to any amounts earned from bonuses, overtime, or commissions
in addition to wages and salaries earned.
3In some years overtime hours are reported while in other years we only know whether they worked
overtime or not.
4In many survey years workers are not asked if their compensation package involves a mixture of
salary/hourly pay and a variable component. All they are asked is how they are paid if not by the hour or
a salary. Although there is no way to directly verify it, this likely results in understating the incidence of
either form of variable pay because workers are not allowed to answer that they are paid, say, a salary, and
then report a commission: they have to choose. Our assertion that it likely understates the extent of variable
pay is motivated in part by the fact that workers in the NLSY, to be described below, are not restricted in
describing the way they are paid, and workers in the NLSY are more likely to report having part of their
compensation package containing a variable pay component.
8commissions, tips, and overtime work over the previous calendar year. Thus there is no need
to back out an estimate of bonuses from an aggregate amount since the question is asked
directly. For the sake of comparability with the pre-1993 years, we nevertheless classify as
receiving no variable pay all workers who report any overtime work. Thus for each year of the
employment relationship we are able to determine whether the worker￿ s total compensation
included a variable pay component. One obvious drawback is that it is likely the variable pay
component we construct will be noisy. However, due to our treatment of overtime workers,
we conservatively lean on the side of misclassifying workers as receiving no variable pay, even
if they do.
De￿ning performance pay jobs5 One of the main goals of this paper is to see whether
employment relationships that involve performance are systematically di⁄erent from those
in which no such performance pay is ever received. Thus we de￿ne performance pay jobs
as employment relationships in which part of the worker￿ s total compensation includes a
variable pay component (either a bonus, a commission, or a piece rate) at least once during
the course of the relationship. In some sense, we are not so much interested in what happen
within an employment relationship at the time some performance pay such as a bonus is
received, as to what is the di⁄erence between one type of job and the other.6 Two related
measurement issues arise. The ￿rst one is a simple measurement error issue. On the one
hand, we are likely to misclassify performance pay jobs as non performance pay jobs if some
employment relationships are terminated before performance pay is received. This would
be particularly problematic if the ￿rst receipt performance pay, which identi￿es the job as a
performance pay job, tends to occur later instead of sooner in the course of the employment
relationship. On the other hand, some of the jobs are wrongly classi￿ed as performance
pay jobs for reasons discuss earlier (e.g. end of year bonus). While it is a priori di¢ cult
to assess which of the false positive or false negative problems are more important, their
5To avoid confusion, note that we use ￿jobs￿ , ￿employment relationship￿ , and ￿job match￿interchange-
ably. Although in most of the survey years spanning the sample period, the PSID does have information
on tenure in the position, we are not using it. As is well known, simply determining employer tenure in the
PSID can be problematic (Brown and Light (1992)).
6That being said, we also look at the within job impacts using an alternative de￿nition of a performance
pay job. More on that below.
9consequence is the same: assuming there is a genuine di⁄erence between the two types
of jobs, misclassi￿cation will tend to attenuate such di⁄erences. Our measurement model
explicitly deals with this issue by introducing the probabilities sp and sn. ￿False positives￿
mean that sp < 1, while ￿false negatives￿mean that sn > 0.
The second related issue is an ￿end point￿problem: given our de￿nition of performance
pay jobs, we may mechanically understate the fraction of workers in such jobs at the start
of our sample period because most employment relationships started before 1976. Similarly,
jobs which started toward the end of the sample period may be performance pay jobs but
are classi￿ed otherwise because they have not lasted long enough for performance pay to
be observed. The basic measurement problem is that, conditional on job duration, we tend
to observe a given job match fewer times at the two ends of our sample period than in the
middle of the sample period. Consider, for example, the case of a job that lasts for ￿ve year.
For jobs that last from 1985 to 1989, all ￿ve observations on this job match are captured in
our PSID sample. For jobs that last from 1973 to 1977, however, only two of the ￿ve years of
the job match are captured in our PSID sample, which mechanically reduces the probability
of classifying the job as performance pay.
The source of the ￿end point￿problem is thus that it results in an unbalanced distribution
of the number of observed job match observations at di⁄erent point of the sample period.
One simple solution to the problem is to ￿rebalance￿the sample using regression or other
methods. In practice, what we do is to create a variable counting the number of job matches
observed for each job (as opposed to the actual job duration), and then add this variable as an
additional control in the regression models. Similarly, the corrected incidence of performance
pay over time can be computed by running a linear probability model (or a logit) in which
year dummies and the number of times the job-match is observed are included as regressors.
The year dummies then capture the corrected incidence of pay for performance job. All
the graphs of the incidence of pay for performance reported below are adjusted using this
procedure.7
7Note that the PSID became a bi-annual survey after 1996. This poses a problem in aligning job in-
formation (tenure, industry, etc.) which relate to the job held at the interview to the earnings information,
including bonus amounts, which is for the calendar year before the interview.
10Descriptive statistics Table 1 compares the sample characteristics of workers on perform-
ance pay and non-performance pay jobs, respectively. First notice that 37 percent of the
30,424 observations are in performance pay jobs, though these raw ￿gures must be interpreted
with caution because of the end-point problem discussed earlier. Workers on performance
pay jobs tend to earn more and be more educated than workers on non-performance pay jobs.
Note that the hourly wage rate includes both regular wage and salary earnings and perform-
ance pay in the case of workers on performance pay jobs. Annual hours worked and employer
tenure also tends to be higher for workers on performance pay than non-performance pay
jobs.
Not surprisingly, the unionization rate (percent covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments) is much lower among performance pay workers, suggesting that, as expected, pay
structure in union ￿rms tend to have wages attached to jobs instead of workers. Another
important di⁄erence is that there is a much higher fraction of workers paid by the hour in
non-performance than performance pay jobs. On the ￿ ip side, workers on performance pay
jobs are much more likely to be salaried workers than those on non-performance pay jobs.
This is an important point since the growth in wage inequality has been stronger among
salaried than hourly workers (Lemieux (2006)). Performance pay is thus more likely to af-
fect the very group of workers who have experienced the largest increase in inequality, and
who are also least likely to be a⁄ected by other institutional factors such as the minimum
wage or de-unionization.
The cross tabulations shown in Table 2 con￿rm that performance pay is more prevalent
in high-wage occupations like professional, managers, and sales workers than in other occu-
pations. For example, the fraction of workers on performance pay jobs ranges from only 14
percent for laborers, to 44 percent for managers. By contrast, performance pay is used fairly
evenly across industries except for construction where it is not very prevalent, and ￿nance,
insurance and real estate (FIRE) where is very widely used.
Figure 1 provides additional descriptive information on the distribution of wages for
performance pay and non-performance pay jobs by reporting kernel density estimates of the
distribution of hourly wages. The ￿gure shows that hourly wages have a higher mean and
median, are less evenly distributed in performance pay than non-performance pay jobs.
We next turn to the time trends in the prevalence performance pay. Figures 2a to
112e show the evolution of the fraction of performance pay jobs for various subgroups of
the workforce. In all cases, we correct for the end-point problem by estimating a linear
probability model in which we control for year dummies and the number of times each job-
match is observed. The incidence of pay for performance jobs reported in the ￿gures is
then the predicted probabilities implied by the estimates year e⁄ects, holding the number of
observed job matches at a ￿xed value (close to the mean for the relevant sample analyzed). In
all ￿gures, we also report the simple incidence of pay for performance obtained by computing
the fraction of workers who report some performance pay in a given year. As argued above,
this strongly understates the incidence of performance pay jobs since workers on performance
pay jobs will not necessarily receive a performance payment (like a bonus) in each year on
the job. The advantage of this simple measure, however, is that it is not a⁄ected by the end-
point problem and provides additional evidence on the robustness of the underlying trends
in performance pay.
Figure 2a shows that the overall incidence of performance pay jobs has increased from a
little more than 30 percent in the late 1970s to over 40 percent in the 1990s. The incidence
is computed holding the number of times a job-match is observed at 5, which is close to the
average value in the sample. The simpler measure based on the fraction of workers reporting
performance pay in a given year also clearly increases over time, especially in the 1980s.
Figure 2a also shows the fraction of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
Remarkably, the line showing the fraction of unionized workers is almost the mirror image
of the performance pay job incidence line.
As mentioned earlier, the decline in unionization has been found to be an important
contributor to increased wage inequality in the United States, and on the surface it would
appear that one simple mechanism by which de-unionization would have increased wage
dispersion is by allowing ￿rms to o⁄er more variable pay, possibly in the form of bonuses.
However, as we can see in Figures 2b and 2c, a particularly informative way of looking at
the increase in the incidence of performance pay jobs is to break it down by how workers
are paid. While it is true that performance pay job incidence shows some increase in hourly
paid jobs at the same time as those jobs went through rapid de-unionization (Figure 2b),
the bulk of the increase in Figure 2a is driven by salaried workers who are not likely to be
unionized at any time (Figure 2c). The increase in the incidence of performance pay jobs
12among salaried workers illustrated in Figure 2c is quite remarkable. It increases from about
30 percent in the late 1970s to close to 50 percent by the end of the sample period.
A strong case for a simple de-unionization explanation would have been found if, for
example, the fraction of performance pay jobs was constant in both the union and non-
union sectors across all years and the combination of de-unionization with the fact that
non-union jobs have more performance pay could have produced the overall increase shown
in Figure 2a. Figures 2d and 2e show, however, that the incidence of performance pay jobs
increased both among union and non-union workers, though the increase was somewhat
steadier among non-union workers.
In the analysis of the wage structure and wage inequality presented in the next sections,
we use a measure of hourly wages de￿ned as the ratio of all earnings (whether paid for
performance or not) over hours of work.
Next in Figure 3 we show the distribution of the share of performance pay in total labor
earnings. To compute the share we use the amounts directly reported by respondents over
the 1993-1999 period for the amounts earned in commission, bonuses, and tips earned in
the previous calendar year.8 Given that the median share is about 3.5% of total earnings,
it is clear that performance pay, per se, only represents a relatively modest component of
total compensation. We thus interpret the presence of performance pay as only an indicator
that wages (both the straight wage and the performance pay component) are paid more
competitively in performance pay than non-performance pay jobs.
3.2 Performance pay in the NLSY and other data sources
As mentioned earlier, we also provide some supporting evidence from the NLSY that asks
more explicitly about pay for performance in the 1988, 1989, 1990, 1996, 1998 and 2000
waves of the panel. To simplify the analysis, we pool the 1988-1990 observations into a ￿late
1980s￿period, and the 1996-2000 observations into a ￿late 1990s￿period. As in the case of
8Note that it also possible to back out an estimate of bonus amounts earned in pre-1993 data by using
the set of questions on amounts earned in overtime, bonuses, or commissions and the questions on overtime
work and pay method. Turning to ￿missing￿all observations in which respondents either worked overtime of
report commissions earnings, we get an estimate of bonuses earned. The resulting distribution of the share
of bonuses earned is very similar to the one shown on Figure 3.
13the PSID, we only focus on males. We also impose a couple of additional sample restrictions
similar to those used by Gibbons et al. (2005). As in the case of the PSID, we classify a
job as a performance pay job when the worker reports performance pay at least once on this
job. Note, however, that the limited number of years in which performance pay is measured
means that we are less likely to ￿catch￿performance pay jobs. We nonetheless ￿nd that the
incidence of performance pay jobs increases from 26.1 percent in the late 1980s to 30 percent
in the late 1990s, which is broadly consistent with the evidence from the PSID.
As an additional check of the robustness of the trends in performance pay, we also looked
at an additional source of information based on survey of Fortune 1000 corporations conduc-
ted between 1987 and 2003 (see Lawler (2003)). The surveys asks ￿rms about the fraction
of their workers with some forms of performance pay and reports results in categories such
as 0 to 9 percent, 10 to 19 percent, etc. We compute the implied fraction of workers with
performance pay using the mid-points of these intervals. The implied fractions are 20.7 in
1987, 27.1 in 1990, 34.7 in 1996, and 44.5 in 2002. Once again, these trends con￿rms the
growth in performance paid measured (imperfectly) in the PSID data.
4 The wage structure in performance pay and non-
performance pay jobs
The model of Section 2 provides a number of testable implications on how the structure of
wages should di⁄er in performance pay and non-performance pay jobs. In this section, we
present the main estimation results and discuss how they relate to the predictions of the
model of Section 2.
Table 3 reports a number of simple regression estimates of the e⁄ect of performance pay
on wages (full compensation, including the pay for performance payments). Note that there
are no particular reasons to expect that pay for performance jobs pay more (or less) than
non-performance pay jobs. The main predictions outlined in Section 2 rather have to do with
di⁄erences in the returns to measured and unmeasured characteristics in the two sectors.
The ￿rst column of Table 3 reports the results of a simple OLS regression of the log
hourly wage on a dummy for performance pay jobs. The regressions reported in Table 3 also
14control for education, experience, seniority and occupation. The estimated e⁄ect is positive
(7-8 percent) and statistically signi￿cant. The second column shows that the e⁄ect of having
a pay for performance job declines by half when a dummy for performance pay received
during the year is included. When worker speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects are introduced in column 3,
the e⁄ect of performance pay jobs becomes essentially zero and insigni￿cant, while the e⁄ect
of receiving pay for performance in a given year remains positive and signi￿cant.
These results suggest two interesting observations. First, including standard controls for
measured and unmeasured workers characteristics (column 3) explains the whole di⁄erence in
raw wages between performance pay and non-performance pay jobs documented in Table 1.
This is a useful result since there is no reason, a priori, to expect that performance pay jobs
should pay more after adjusting for di⁄erences in workers characteristics. This suggests that
the relevant heterogeneity is captured by the covariates and the worker-specifc ￿xed e⁄ect.
A second useful observation is that the estimated e⁄ect of pay for performance payment in
a given year is around 5 percent in column 3 and in column 4 where we further control for
worker-job ￿xed e⁄ects (the e⁄ects of performance pay jobs is no longer identi￿ed in this
speci￿cation). This is quite similar to the average magnitude of performance pay income
reported in Figure 3, which in turns suggest that we are simply capturing the ￿mechanical￿
e⁄ect of performance in a given year. This further supports the view that heterogeneity is
well controlled for once ￿xed e⁄ects are included in the speci￿cations. In the presence of
uncontrolled heterogeneity correlated with pay for performance payment, we would expect
the estimated coe¢ cient to be biased up above the expected mechanical e⁄ect of around 5
percent.
Table 4 provides a ￿rst direct test of some of the implications of the model of Section
2. Columns 1 and 2 report separate estimates of a standard wage equation for performance
pay and non-performance pay jobs, respectively. Once again, the estimated models include
both standard human capital characteristics like education and experience (the variables
xit in Section 2), and job characteristics such as seniority and occupation dummies (the
variables zijt in Section 2). As expected, the return to education and potential experience
is larger in performance pay than non-performance pay jobs. The return to education is
40 percent larger in performance pay than non-performance pay jobs (0.093 vs. 0.066)
while the return to experience is 60 percent larger (0.0093 vs. 0.0058). The same pattern
15of results can be observed in Figure 4 that shows in more detail the relationship between
wages and education in performance pay and non-performance pay jobs. The results also
remain relatively unchanged when a person-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ect is introduced in columns 3
and 4. For instance, the coe¢ cient on education is 0.018 larger in bonus than non-bonus
jobs (compared to a 0.028 di⁄erence in OLS models). Note that we estimate a pooled model
with interactions because education is almost time-invariant (for a given person) in our PSID
sample. This means that we cannot separately identify the e⁄ect of education from the ￿xed
e⁄ect when running separate models for performance pay and non-performance pay jobs. The
interaction term between performance pay and education is still identi￿ed, however, because
of the ￿switchers￿who that are both observed on performance pay and non-performance pay
jobs. The results for education mean, for example, that more educated workers get a bigger
wage gain from switching from a non-performance pay to a performance pay job than less
educated workers. Overall, the results support the implication of the model that returns to
measured skills are higher in performance pay than non-performance pay jobs.
By contrast, the e⁄ect of seniority is lower in performance pay than non-performance
pay jobs. This is consistent with the view that seniority is a job characteristics that matters
when wages are attached to jobs, but not when wages are attached to workers. The di⁄erence
remains signi￿cant (and quantitatively larger) when worker ￿xed e⁄ects are added in columns
3 and 4. The other key set of job characteristics we focus on are occupation dummies.
Table 5 shows both OLS and ￿xed e⁄ect estimates of the (one-digit) occupation e⁄ects for
performance pay and non-performance pay jobs (the other variables shown in Table 4 are
included in these regressions but not reported in the table). As in Gibbons et al. (2005),
including worker-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ect dramatically reduces the magnitude of the occupation
e⁄ects. After controlling for ￿xed e⁄ects, the standard deviation of the occupation e⁄ects is
smaller in performance pay jobs (0.051) than in non-performance pay jobs (0.062). This is,
once again, consistent with the predictions of Section 2.
Table 6 explores the other predictions of the model about how the variance of the di⁄erent
components of the error term compare for performance pay and non-performance pay jobs.9
The most interesting comparison is column 2 vs. column 4 of Panel B. Only ￿switchers￿
9See Parent (1999) for a related analysis with the NLSY comparing piece rate/commission workers and
those receiving bonuses to salaried and hourly paid workers.
16who are observed on both performance pay and non-performance pay jobs are used in Panel
B. This means that the underlying variance of the person-speci￿c component ￿i is the same
for the performance pay and non-performance pay samples. As a result, the relative return
to this component in performance pay and non-performance pay jobs, d
p
t=dn
t , is equal to
the square root of the ratio of the estimated variance of ￿i in performance pay and non-




t is equal to 1.46. In other words, d
p
t is 46 percent larger than dn
t . This is very interesting
since we found in Table 4 that the return to education and experience in performance pay
jobs also exceeded the return on non-performance pay jobs by factor in the 40-60 percent
range. Strictly speaking, the model implies that all these returns should be proportional
with a factor a proportionality given by sp=sn. This simple model thus appears to be a
parsimonious way of modelling the wage structure in performance pay and non-performance
pay jobs.
Also consistent with the theoretical predictions, the results indicate that the variance
of the job-speci￿c term is much smaller in performance pay (0.009) than non-performance
pay jobs (0.038). In intuitive terms, this suggests that the ￿rm an individuals works for
explains quite a bit of the wage variation in non-performance pay jobs, but much less in
performance pay jobs. This provides quite convincing evidence that pay for performance is
indeed a good proxy for whether wages are attached to workers instead of jobs. Finally, the
variance of the ￿residual￿or idiosyncratic term is slightly smaller in performance pay than
in non-performance pay jobs. Remember, however, that the model did not have speci￿c
predictions about whether this variance should be larger in one type of job or the other.
We also present some complementary evidence from the NLSY in Table 7. As in the case
of the PSID, we run separate wage regressions for performance pay and non-performance pay
jobs. We also exploit the fact that the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) score, which
is available in the NLSY, can be used as a proxy for unmeasured productive characteristics.
Since the AFQT score is a pure worker characteristic, as opposed to a job characteristic, its
e⁄ect on wages should be larger in performance pay than in non-performance pay jobs. Table
7 con￿rms that both in the late 1980s and in the late 1990s, returns to productive worker
characteristics (education, experience, and the AFQT score) are larger in performance pay
than non-performance pay jobs.
17In summary, our analysis of the PSID data strongly supports the view that wages on
performance pay jobs are more closely linked to productive characteristics than wages on non-
performance pay jobs. Relative to performance pay jobs, wages on these other jobs depend
more on the characteristics of the jobs people hold than on the productive characteristics of
the individuals. The fact that the results from the NLSY where we use a di⁄erent measure
of pay for performance are similar to the main PSID results highlights the robustness of our
main ￿ndings. The next section explores the implications of these ￿ndings for the growth of
wage inequality between the late 1970s and the early 1990s.
5 Performance pay and the growth in wage inequality
In this section, we perform a decomposition that is very similar to what has been done to
quantify the contribution of de-unionization to the growth in wage inequality. As in the
case of unions, we decompose the e⁄ect of performance pay into a between- and within-
group component. The between-group component, or ￿wage gap￿e⁄ect, re￿ ects the fact
that a positive wage gap between performance pay and non-performance pay jobs tends to
increase inequality. The within-group (groups being performance pay and non-performance
pay jobs) component can be divided in two subterms. First, higher returns to measurable
characteristics (education and experience) in performance pay jobs create more wage disper-
sion within the performance pay sector. Similarly, di⁄erences in the variance of the error
term can also contribute to the e⁄ect of performance pay on overall inequality. This latter
term could be further split up into the three error components discussed above (person-
speci￿c, ￿rm-speci￿c, and the idiosyncratic or residual term). Finally, we use DiNardo et al.
(1996)￿ s procedure to adjust for di⁄erences in the distribution of measured characteristics
when computing the various counterfactuals. See DiNardo and Lemieux (1997) for a very
similar decomposition applied to unionization.
Before presenting the decomposition results, we ￿rst report some descriptive information
on the trends in wage inequality to be explained. Figure 5 summarize the changes in wage
inequality in our PSID data by showing the evolution of the standard deviation of wages in
performance pay, non-performance pay, and all jobs between 1977 and 1996. As expected,
18the ￿gure indicates a substantial increase in inequality over time. For example, Panel A of
Figure 5 shows that the standard deviation of hourly wages for all jobs increased from about
0.52 in 1977 to over 0.60 in the early 1990s, before going down a bit in the 1990s. More
interestingly, the standard deviation for performance pay jobs increased generally faster than
in non-performance pay jobs. This pattern is even clearer in Panel B that only focuses on
full-time/full-year workers. Along with Figure 2a, these results suggest that performance
pay jobs are closely linked to the growth of wage inequality since 1) inequality grew faster
in performance pay jobs, and 2) the growing incidence of performance pay jobs means that
an increasingly large fraction of workers are employed in this more unequal sector.
The decomposition results are reported in Table 8. The decomposition is performed for
all workers, but wages are weighted by the number of hours of work to get a distribution
of wages representative over all the hours worked in the economy, as in DiNardo et al.
(1996). As indicated at the bottom of the table, the variance grew by 0.1076 over the period
considered (1976-79 to 1990-93). The question is how much of this can be attributed to the
rising incidence in performance pay jobs from 0.3191 (column 2) to 0.4750 (column 5)? In
terms of the three components discussed above, the between or wage gap component (row
7) increased from 0.0039 in the 1976-79 to 0.0127 in 1990-93. The within-group component
associated to observables increased from 0.0095 to 0.0295 (row 3). Finally, the e⁄ect related
to the variance of the error term (row 6) decreased from 0.0052 to 0.0028, o⁄setting in part
the two other factors. We show at the bottom of the table that the three terms combined
together explain 0.0264, or 25 percent, of the overall increase in the variance.
6 Conclusion
An increasing fraction of jobs in the U.S. labor market include a performance pay component
in addition to regular wages and salaries. In this paper, we look at the e⁄ect of the growing
incidence of performance pay on wage inequality. The basic premise of the paper is that
performance pay jobs have a more ￿competitive￿ pay structure that rewards productive
characteristics of workers more than other jobs. We develop a simple model to illustrate
this point and derive several testable implications. Consistent with this view, we show
19that compensation in performance pay jobs is more closely tied to both measured (by the
econometrician) and unmeasured productive characteristics of workers. We conclude that
the growing incidence of performance pay accounts for 25 percent of the growth in male wage
inequality between the late 1970s and the early 1990s.
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